The DDT Holocaust deniers have about half a dozen simple but devastating tricks in which to hide tens of millions of murdered black babies under the floorboards.
On this thread I’ll name just one of them. And this is the trick which says that if you are in favour of an airforce you are against the navy, the army, and all forms of intelligence-gathering. So the implication is that if you are for the freedom to manufacture, buy and use DDT that means that you are totally against any other measures to destroy the mosquitoes.
Taking away your airforce can certainly be enough to give a decisive win to the other side. And bureaucratising DDT is a decisive blow against the humans and in favour of the Mosquitoes and the Malarial agents. But is there any truth to this charge? That those who were desperately fighting Malaria were doing so on the basis of spraying alone.
Here is a highly snipped extract from an article a committed holocaust-denier posted which went directly against his own trashing of history:
I’ve cut down the link to the points that are most relevant to how a real expert goes about destroying mosquitoes. Spraying isn’t the whole strategy. But its an essential part of strategy. Like artillery barrages. Or the use of airpower. If you cut it out your side will lose and the mosquitoes will win. And thats what did happen. We notice also from the extended quote that 1963 was the key year when things went wrong. This ought to surprise no-one.
“….Fred Soper, who ranks as one of the unsung heroes of the twentieth century. With DDT as his weapon, Soper almost saved the world from one of its most lethal afflictions.
……. Soper disagreed. Fighting malaria, he said, had very little to do with the intricacies of science and biology. The key was learning to think like the men he hired to go door-to-door and stream-to-stream, killing mosquitoes. His method was to apply motivation, discipline, organization, and zeal, in understanding human nature. Fred Soper was the General Patton of entomology.
While working in South America in 1930, Soper had enforced a rigorous protocol for inspecting houses for mosquito infestation, which involved checking cisterns and climbing along roof gutters. (He pushed himself so hard perfecting the system in the field that he lost twenty-seven pounds in three months.) He would map an area to be cleansed of mosquitoes, give each house a number, and then assign each number to a sector. A sector, in turn, would be assigned to an inspector, armed with the crude pesticides then available; the inspector’s schedule for each day was planned to the minute, in advance, and his work double-checked by a supervisor. If a supervisor found a mosquito that the inspector had missed, he received a bonus. And if the supervisor found that the inspector had deviated by more than ten minutes from his preassigned schedule the inspector was docked a day’s pay………
……..One of Soper’s greatest early victories came in Brazil, in the late nineteen-thirties, when he took on a particularly vicious strain of mosquito known as Anopheles gambiae. There are about twenty-five hundred species of mosquito in the world, each with its own habits and idiosyncrasies–some like running water, some like standing water, some bite around the ankles, some bite on the arms, some bite indoors, some bite outdoors–but only mosquitoes of the genus Anopheles are capable of carrying the human malaria parasite. And, of the sixty species of Anopheles that can transmit malaria, gambiae is the variety best adapted to spreading the disease. In California, there is a strain of Anopheles known as freeborni, which is capable of delivering a larger dose of malaria parasite than gambiae ever could. But freeborni is not a good malaria vector, because it prefers animals to people. Gambiae, by contrast, bites humans ninety-five per cent of the time. It has long legs and yellow-and-black spotted wings. It likes to breed in muddy pools of water, even in a water-filled footprint. And, unlike many mosquitoes, it is long-lived, meaning that once it has picked up the malaria parasite it can spread the protozoan to many others. Gambiae gathers in neighborhoods in the evenings, slips into houses at dusk, bites quietly and efficiently during the night, digests its “blood meal” while resting on the walls of the house, and then slips away in the morning. In epidemiology, there is a concept known as the “basic reproduction number,” or BRN, which refers to the number of people one person can infect with a contagious disease. The number for H.I.V., which is relatively difficult to transmit, is just above one. For measles, the BRN is between twelve and fourteen. But with a vector like gambiae in the picture the BRN for malaria can be more than a hundred, meaning that just one malarious person can be solely responsible for making a hundred additional people sick. The short answer to the question of why malaria is such an overwhelming problem in Africa is that gambiae is an African mosquito.
………..Soper told Brazilian officials to open the dykes damming the tidal flats, because salt water from the ocean would destroy the gambiae breeding spots. The government refused. Over the next few years, there were a number of small yet worrisome outbreaks of malaria, followed by a few years of drought, which kept the problem in check. Then, in 1938, the worst malaria epidemic in the history of the Americas broke out. Gambiae had spread a hundred and fifty miles along the coast and inland, infecting a hundred thousand people and killing as many as twenty thousand.
Soper was called in. This was several years before the arrival of DDT, so he brought with him the only tools malariologists had in those years: diesel oil and an arsenic-based mixture called Paris green, both of which were spread on the pools of water where gambiae larvae bred; and pyrethrum, a natural pesticide made from a variety of chrysanthemum, which was used to fumigate buildings. Four thousand men were put at his disposal.
He drew maps and divided up his troops. The men wore uniforms, and carried flags to mark where they were working, and they left detailed written records of their actions, to be reviewed later by supervisors. When Soper discovered twelve gambiae in a car leaving an infected area, he set up thirty de-insectization posts along the roads, spraying the interiors of cars and trucks; seven more posts on the rail lines; and defumigation posts at the ports and airports. ………………….. His goal was to eliminate gambiae from every inch of the region of Brazil that they had colonized–an area covering some eighteen thousand square miles.
It was an impossible task. Soper did it in twenty-two months.
Soper’s diary records a growing fascination with this new weapon. July 25, 1943: “Lunch with L.L. Williams and Justin Andrews. L.L. reports that he has ordered 10,000 lbs of Neocid [DDT]and that Barber reports it to be far superior to [Paris Green]for mosquitoes.” February 25, 1944: “Knipling visits laboratory. Malaria results [for DDT]ARE FANTASTIC.” When Rome fell, in mid-1944, Soper declared that he wanted to test DDT in Sardinia, the most malarious part of Italy. In 1947, he got his wish. He pulled out his old organization charts from Brazil. The island–a rocky, mountainous region the size of New Hampshire, with few roads–was mapped and divided up hierarchically, the smallest unit being the area that could be covered by a sprayer in a week. Thirty-three thousand people were hired. More than two hundred and eighty-six tons of DDT were acquired. Three hundred and thirty-seven thousand buildings were sprayed.
The target Anopheles was labranchiae, which flourishes not just in open water but also in the thick weeds that surround the streams and ponds and marshes of Sardinia. Vegetation was cut back, and a hundred thousand acres of swampland were drained. Labranchiae larvae were painstakingly collected and counted and shipped to a central laboratory, where precise records were kept of the status of the target vector. In 1946, before the campaign started, there were seventy-five thousand malaria cases on the island. In 1951, after the campaign finished, there were nine.
“The locals regarded this as the best thing that had ever happened to them,” Thomas Aitken says. He had signed on with the Rockefeller Foundation after the war, and was one of the leaders of the Sardinian effort. “The fact that malaria was gone was welcome,” he went on. “But also the DDT got rid of the houseflies. Sardinian houses were made of stone. The wires for the lights ran along the walls near the ceiling. And if you looked up at the wires they were black with housefly droppings from over the years. And suddenly the flies disappeared.”
You see all along it is implied in the holocaust-denying story of Quiggin, Lambert, Bug Girl and others…. the idea that the pro-spraying crowd needed to be lectured by the holocaust-perpetraters on matters to do with non-spraying combat of mosquitoes.
From the above we see that nothing could be further from the truth. And this implication that comes across like a relentless rolling thunder of implied-lying is just one of the several tricks of the leftist anti-science history-trashing holocaust-deniers.
A fair and balanced assessment of the DDT-Bureaucratisation-Holocaust. Its off the top of his head and you can quibble with one or two of the concrete facts he says. But thats not the real point of the issue.
Supposing it is fullscale war and you are evenly matched with the enemy. And the news came through that your air-power was less effective then you thought. That it was killing too many civilians, that the enemy had a new class of anti-aircraft resistance weapons coming out of the factories. That some of the bombs were effectively being exploded in midair and that this percentage was set to increase.
Do you work on targeting better and beefing up you non-air warfighting? Or do you scrap your airforce on the grounds that the enemy may adapt to it even a little bit more.
The answer is you adapt but you never throw whole classes of weapons away.
Doing less spraying wasn’t the answer. The answer was doubling and tripling the efforts in other areas. And then one fine day you might find that you only need to spray every few years.
The fact is we can win against Malaria and the mosquitoes. But not if liberty is compromised or if environmentalists are in any way given authority or involved.
I’ll give you are paradoxical example. The Cod. We fished Cod for 100’s of years. And it looked like we would always be able to fish Cod. The amount of Cod we pulled from the water from 1400 to 1900 must have been truly stunning and a marvel. And if you take the Cod the Cods own food supply is enhanced. Hence more Cod. And if you take the Cod the Cods predators are diminished. Hence more Cod.
But we broke the back of the Cod population just the same. And by overfishing ruined one of the most valuable industries in all of history.
Likewise we can destroy Malaria and all of the more serious mosquito-born diseases. Its not an easy undertaking. And it may await hyper-federalism and hard money in Africa since it probably cannot be done by aid alone. But it can be done. The main thing is that restrictions to the weaponry needed to achieve this must be both voluntary and local. Because if you centralise anything the environmentalists will repeat this (still ongoing) murder and this you can count on.
You can see what went wrong can’t you? DDT was so effective that it was overused. Not in the sense that too much of it was sprayed necessarily. But in the sense that it was cheap an easy to spray and not do the follow-up hard yards like Soper had done in the old days.
The answer was not to restrict DDT. But go overkill on the other activities such that you find sooner or later that the DDT is piling up in local storage.